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Transitional Justice Genealogy 
Ruti G. Teitel* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes a genealogy of transitional justice. 1 Transitional jus-
tice can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of 
political change,2 characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdo-
ings of repressive predecessor regimes.3 The genealogy presented in this Ar-
ticle traces the historical pursuit of justice in periods of political flux, re-
viewing the political developments of the last half-century and analyzing the 
evolution of the conception of transitional justice.4 This Article contends 
that a genealogy of transitional justice demonstrates, over time, a close rela-
tionship between the type of justice pursued and the relevant limiting po-
litical conditions. Currently, the discourse is directed at preserving a mini-
malist rule of law identified chiefly with maintaining peace. 
The proposed genealogy is structured along critical cycles that divide 
along three phases. 5 This Article begins by briefly describing the phases, and 
then elaborates upon each phase as well as upon the critical dynamic inter-
relationships of the three phases within the genealogy.6 The notion of gene-
alogy presented in this Article is structured along the lines of and situated 
within an intellectual history.7 Accordingly, the genealogy is organized 
* Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School. My gratitude to Camille 
Broussard and Elisa Gerontianos for their research assistance, and to Carlene Walsh for word processing 
assistance. My thanks to Danielle Celermajer, Bronwyn Leebow, Markus Mueller, Cliff Simms, and Jona-
than Stein for their helpful comments. A much earlier version of this Article was presented at the Euro-
pean Law Research Center Spring Conference 2002: The Globalization of Modern Legal Thought, Production 
and Reception, I 850-2000, Harvard Law School. 
l. For a comprehensive analysis of transitional justice, see RuTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
(2000). 
2. See GUILLERMO O'DoNNELL & PHILIPPE C. ScHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 6 (1998) (defining transition as the inter-
val between one political regime and another). 
3. For a helpful compilation, see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON 
WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1997). 
4. See TEITEL, supra note l; Ruti Teitel, Transitional jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transfor-
mation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009 (1997). 
5. The use of the term "phases" here should be considered primarily as a heuristic, ro help understand 
the periodization of the various political and legal periods. This is not to say that there are acoustic sepa-
rations dividing these phases. Indeed, there are overlaps among the three phases proposed here. 
6. On the "critical" responses of transitional justice to predecessor political repressions, see TEITEL, 
supra note 1, at 216, 220-25. 
7. Regarding genealogy, see Michel Foucault, Nietzche, Genealogy, History (Donald F. Bouchard & 
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along a schematic of the development of ideas associated with the three 
phases of transitional justice. These phases ultimately reflect the genealogy's 
link with the broader intellectual trend toward an increased pragmatism in 
and politicization of the law.8 
The origins of modern transitional justice can be traced to World War I.9 
However, transitional justice becomes understood as both extraordinary and 
international in the postwar period after 1945. The Cold War ends the in-
ternationalism of this first, or postwar, phase of transitional justice. The sec-
ond, or post-Cold War, phase is associated with the wave of democratic 
transitions and modernization that began in 1989. Toward the end of the 
twentieth century, global politics was characterized by an acceleration in 
conflict resolution and a persistent discourse of justice throughout law and 
society. The third, or steady-state, phase of transitional justice is associated 
with contemporary conditions of persistent conflict which lay the foundation 
for a normalized law of violence. 
Phase I of the genealogy, the postwar phase, began in 1945. Through its 
most recognized symbol, the Allied-run Nuremberg Trials, iO this phase 
reflects the triumph of transitional justice within the scheme of international 
law. However, this development was not enduring, due to its association 
with the exceptional political conditions of the postwar period: Germany's 
diminished sovereignty formed the basis for international nation-building. 
These political conditions were unique, and would neither persist nor recur 
in the same manner. Accordingly, this first phase of transitional justice, asso-
ciated with interstate cooperation, war crimes trials, and sanctions, ended 
soon after the war. Beginning in the 1950s, the Cold War and a stable bi-
polar balance of power led to a general political equilibrium and an impasse 
on the question of transitional justice. Nevertheless, the legacy of the post-
war trials that criminalized state wrongdoing as part of a universal rights 
scheme far exceeds the actual force of historical precedent, and this legacy 
forms the basis of modern human rights law.ii 
Sherry Simon trans.) in THE FOUCAULT READER 80 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). On genealogical politics, 
see WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY, 91-120 (2001 ); MICHAEL CLIFFORD, POLITICAL GE-
NEALOGY AFTER FOUCAULT'. SAVAGE IDENTITIES 149-70 (2001 ). 
8. On pragmatism, see Marion Smiley, Democratic justice in Transition, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1332 (2001) 
(discussing pragmatic views of transitional justice and reviewing Ruti Teitel's Transitional justice). See also 
Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Principles and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, Presented at 
the Olin Institute National Security Seminar at Harvard University (December 2001) (on file with 
author). 
9. For historical examples see TEITEL, supra note 1, at 31, 39-40; for earlier precedents see also MI-
CHAEL WALZER, REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION'. SPEECHES ON THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI (Michael Walzer 
ed., Marion Rothstein trans., 1992) (providing a historical account). 
10. On the postwar period, see FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY'. COPING WITH THE LEGACIES 
OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM Qohn H. Herz ed., 1983). Of course, there are earlier 
examples in the century, but these are smaller-scale responses. See PHILLIPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS 
FROM AUTHORITARIAN RUI.E'. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986). 
11. On the impact of the Nuremberg precedent, see Ruti G. Teitel, Nuremherg and Its Legacy, Fifty 
Years Later, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 44 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999). For an exam-
ple of the impact of the postwar precedents in human rights law, see HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, 
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Phase II is associated with a period of accelerated democratization and 
political fragmentation that has been characterized as a "third wave" of tran-
sition.12 Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the collapse and 
disintegration of the Soviet Union led to concurrent transitions throughout 
much of the world. Withdrawal of Soviet-supported guerrilla forces in the 
late 1970s fueled the end of military rule in South America. 13 These transi-
tions were rapidly followed by post-1989 transitions in Eastern Europe, Af-
rica, and Central America. 14 While these changes are often described as iso-
lated developments or as a series of civil wars, many of these conflicts were 
fostered or supported by international power politics15 and were therefore 
affected by the Soviet collapse, which ended the Cold War period of political 
equilibrium. 16 
While the post-Cold War wave of transition theoretically raises the pos-
sibility of a return to Phase I international transitional justice, the form of 
transitional justice that in fact emerges is associated with the rise of nation-
building.17 Moreover, rather than understanding rule of law in terms of ac-
countability for a small number of leaders, the Phase II transitional model tends 
to rely upon more diverse rule-of-law understandings tied to a particular 
political community and local conditions. 18 However, this move toward 
more local or even privatized justice stands in tension with the potential of a 
broader conception of justice associated with transnational politics. 
By the end of the twentieth century, the third steady-state phase of transi-
tional justice emerges. This third phase is characterized by the fin de siecle 
acceleration of transitional justice phenomena associated with globalization 
and typified by conditions of heightened political instability and violence. 19 
Transitional justice moves from the exception to the norm to become a para-
digm of rule of law. In this contemporary phase, transitional jurisprudence 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (2000). 
12. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 'TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1991). 
13. On the Latin American transitions, see PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER ET AL., TRANSITIONS FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA (1986); )AIME MALAMUD-GOT!, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE 
TERROR AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (1996); LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SET-
TLING ACCOUNTS WITH TORTURERS (1998); see also TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: 
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotsky ed., 1993). 
14. See supra note 12. 
15. On Latin America see LARS SCHOULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLICY TO-
WARDS LATIN AMERICA (1987) (discussing Latin America and the global balance of power); see also DAVID 
GREEN, THE CONTAINMENT OF LATIN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE MYTHS AND REALITIES OF THE 
GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY (1971); WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE: THE AMERICAS WATCH REPORT ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (Cynthia Brown ed., 1985). 
16. This is, of course, not to offer unicausal theory, but rather to clarify shared factors in the multiple 
transitions that occurred in approximately the last quarter of the last century. For disciplinary reasons, 
scholarship in each area tends to be isolated. 
17. There are exceptions in the turn to international justice regarding the conflicts in the Balkans and 
in Rwanda. See infra text accompanying note 133. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 53-73. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 128-145. 
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normalizes an expanded discourse of humanitarian justice constructing a 
body of law associated with pervasive conflict, which contributes to laying 
the foundation for the emerging law of terrorism. 
I. PHASE I: POSTWAR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The first phase of a genealogy of transitional justice encompasses the 
post-World War II model of justice. However, the history begins earlier in 
the century, following World War I. During the inter-war period, the cen-
tral aim of justice was to delineate the unjust war and the parameters of 
justifiable punishment by the international community. Questions con-
fronted in this context included whether and to what extent to punish Ger-
many for its aggression, and what form justice should take: international or 
national, collective or individual. Ultimately, the decision to convene inter-
national proceedings reflected the prevailing political circumstances, par-
ticularly the limits upon national sovereignty and the conceded interna-
tional governance of that period. 
A genealogical perspective situates postwar transitional justice in its own 
historical context, specifically the transitional justice of World War 1,20 and 
reveals the extent to which this preceding conception informs the critical 
response of post-World War II justice.21 At least two critical responses 
emerge regarding World War II transitional justice. First, national justice 
was displaced by international justice. The administration of the post-
World War I model of transitional punitive justice, characterized by failed 
national trials, was left to Germany. 22 Seen with the hindsight of history, it 
was clear that the post-World War I national trials did not serve to deter 
future carnage. In an evident critical response to the past, post-World War 
II transitional justice began by eschewing national prosecutions,23 instead 
seeking international criminal accountability for the Reich's leadership.24 
The second critical response concerned the post-World War I collective 
sanctions levied against Germany. 25 Seen through the lens of genealogy, 
20. See NIALL FERGUSON, THE PITY OF WAR: EXPLAINING WORLD WAR I (2000). 
21. Regarding the postwar Allied Trials program, see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992); SHELDON GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR 
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT (Kraus Reprint Co., 1976) (1944). 
22. For an account see Geo. Gordon Battle, The Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused 
of War Crimes, 8 VA. L. REV. 1 (1921). 
23. On the history of the deliberations, see ROBERT I. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983). 
24. However, the subsequent Control Council Ten trials would be convened on a national basis. See 
Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1953) (commonly known as the "green books"). 
25. The Versailles Treacy ar Article 231 provides: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and 
Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to 
which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence 
of a war imposed upon chem by rhe aggression of Germany and her Allies." According to the Treaty's 
"war-guilt" clause, all responsibility for che war was to be borne by Germany. See Treacy of Versailles, 
June 28, 1919, art. 231, pt. VIII, Consol. T.S. 225; see generally NANA SAGI, GERMAN REPARATIONS: A 
HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (Dafna Alon trans., 1980). 
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these transitional responses clearly failed and came to be identified as a basis 
for the sense of economic frustration and resentment that fueled Germany's 
role in World War 11.26 Onerous sanctions and their crude undifferentiated 
impact raised profound normative questions. 27 This approach gave way to 
the critical response after World War II, and to the liberal focus on individ-
ual judgment and responsibility. 
While the asserted aim of the transitional justice norm in this first phase 
was accountability, a striking innovation at the time was the turn to interna-
tional criminal law and the extension of its applicability beyond the state to 
the individual. Moreover, through changes in the law of war and its princi-
ples of criminal responsibility, the international legal regime enabled hold-
ing accountable the Reich's higher echelons for the offenses of aggression 
and persecutory policy. While claims are made about the forward-looking 
nature of deterrence, it is clear that the Nuremberg prosecution was primar-
ily intended to justify and legitimate Allied intervention in the war. 28 This 
use of transitional justice recurs in Phase IIl.29 
The period immediately following World War II was the heyday of inter-
national justice. The critical turn away from prior nationalist transitional 
responses and toward an internationalist policy was thought to guarantee 
rule of law. However, whether deterrence would necessarily be better ad-
vanced by international accountability was debatable. Whereas international 
justice is commonly thought to incorporate the impartiality associated with 
the rule of law,3° other rule-of-law values are seen as deriving from the local 
accountability associated with domestic justice.31 Moreover, following 
World War II, the application of international justice involved legal irregu-
larities which raised tensions for the rule of law, especially given its stated 
liberalizing aim.32 Ultimately, the Phase I model would offer a very limited 
precedent. With the Cold War bifurcation, it became eminently clear that 
this model could not be readily exported. While a form of international jus-
tice does recur in Phase III,33 this more contemporary internationalism has 
been transformed by the ongoing developments caused by globalization.34 
The postwar turn to international law also reflected the sense that the 
relevant subject of transitional justice was an international legal response 
26. See FERGUSON, supra note 20. 
27. The uses of economic sanctions in the contemporary moment have raised similar concerns. On the 
U.S. sanctions debate, see Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. 
Sanctions Against South Africa, 49 INT'L ORG. 451 (1995). 
28. Transicional juscice was used as a norm co discinguish between juscified and unjuscified milicary 
intervention. See TAYLOR, supra noce 21, ac 22-42 (discussing the Nuremberg ideas regarding whether 
launching an aggressive war should be considered a crime under international law). 
29. See infra cexc accompanying noces 133-137. 
30. See ThITEL, supra noce 1, ac 30-39; Scocsky, supra note 13. 
31. These are discussed infra ac Pare II, noces 53-57, 58-73 and accompanying text. See TEITEL, supra 
noce 1 ac 36-40; see generally Scocsky, supra noce 13. 
32. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 336 (1994). 
33. See Teicel, Transitional jurisprudence, supra noce 4. 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 132-137. 
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governed by the law of conflict. Over the years, this legacy has been mixed: 
the force of the precedent has hardly been reflected in other instances of in-
ternational justice,35 although this is arguably changing given the creation 
of the permanent International Criminal Court.36 The postwar legacy's on-
going force has been evident in developments in international law, where 
dimensions of the precedent establishing international accountability for 
wartime abuses were entrenched in international conventions soon after 
World War II, such as the Genocide Convention.37 Moreover, dimensions of 
the postwar precedent, such as its preeminent commitment to individual 
rights, have also informed domestic and comparative law, as evidenced in the 
heightened wave of related constitutionalism.38 In the postwar phase, the 
exportation of forms of transitional justice occurred through legal trans-
plants of treaties, conventions, and constitutionalism. The postwar period 
was also the heyday of the belief in law and development, and more gener-
ally in the belief in law as a tool for state modernization.39 
The international justice associated with the postwar period returns in a 
new form in contemporary post-conflict circumstances, revealing transitional 
justice's critical dynamic. International justice recurs but is transformed by 
past precedents and a new political context. The subject and scope of transi-
tional justice have expanded to transcend its operative action upon states 
and to operate upon private actors. Transitional justice has also extended 
beyond its historic role in regulating international conflict to regulate intra-
state conflict as well as peacetime relations, comprising a threshold rule of 
law in globalizing politics.40 The significance of these developments will be 
discussed further in Phase III. 
35. See Teitel, supra note 11, at 44. The World War II-related prosecutions are still the largest prece-
dents in criminal accountability. For a bibliography of war crimes trials, see WAR CRIMINALS AND WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE BOOK (Norman E. Turerow ed., 1986). See 
Symposium, Holocaust and Human Rights Law: The Sixth International Conference, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 191 (1992). 
36. See infra notes 132-134 (regarding the Rome Srarute). 
37. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, Doc. A/64/Add.l (1946). For a discussion of the 
codification process and efforts of the International Law Commission, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History 
of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 1991 DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST 
THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND 11 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1993); Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 
12, 1951); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948). For broader discussion of these post-war developments, see Ruti G. Teitel, Human Rights Geneal-
ogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1997). 
38. This is evidenced in the constitution-making of the postwar period. See Lorns HENKIN, THE AGE 
OF RIGHTS (1990). On the emerging right to democracy, see Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 46, 5 3 (1992). 
39. John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs fl: SLADE, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 713 (2000). 
See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 483 (1977); see 
a/so THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999). 
40. See infra notes 128-140 and accompanying text. 
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II. PHASE II: POST-COLD WAR ThANSITIONAL]USTICE 
The last two decades of the twentieth century have been characterized as a 
veritable wave of political transition. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
end of the bipolar balance of power, and the attendant proliferation of politi-
cal democratization and modernization ushered in the post-Cold War phase 
of transitional justice.41 
The decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Empire sparked a wave of 
liberalization that began with the transitions in the Southern Cone of South 
America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continued throughout East-
ern Europe and Central America.42 While these regional developments are 
generally represented as independent of one another, a genealogical perspec-
tive illuminates the connection between these political transitions and illus-
trates how many local conflicts were supported by United States/Soviet bi-
polarism.43 The end of this historical schematic does not imply that such 
conflict has also ended, as there remain numerous interconnected insurgency 
movements.44 
When political transitions occurred in the 1980s, the question confronted 
by successor regimes was whether and to what extent to adhere to the Phase 
I model of transitional justice.45 In the new democracies that emerged in 
South America following the collapse of repressive military juntas, it was 
unclear whether trials of leaders in the style of Nuremberg could be suc-
cessfully followed in the Americas.46 This question was first posed in Argen-
tina after the Falklands/Malvinas War,47 where the successor regime at-
tempted to distinguish the context from that of international postwar justice 
and called for domestic trials.48 Throughout Latin America, nascent demo-
41. Other works refer co chis development as the "chird wave'" of democracizacion. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, 
supra noce 12. 
42. See supra noces 14-15; WALTER LEFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: UNITED STATES AND CEN-
TRAL AMERICA (1984). 
43. For a review of this third wave of cransition, see HUNTINGTON, supra noce 12. See also ScHOUL'1-.-:, 
supra noce 15, ac 112-204 (discussing geopolicics and human righcs regarding U.S. policy in Central 
America). 
44. This was made very clear afrer che cerrorisc accacks on Sepcember 11, 2001. See AHMED RASHID, 
JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2002); see also Harold Hongju Koh, A United 
States Human Rights Policy for the 2 lst Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002); infra noces 130-131 and 
accompanying cext. 
45. For a leading advocace of che "Nuremberg Model,"' see Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the 
Guilty?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb 1, 1990; see also ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, 
TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998). 
46. See Ruci G. Teitel, How are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing with the Legacy of Past 
Human Rights Abuses?, in Kricz, supra noce 3; Jaime Malamud-Gori, Transitional Governments in the Breach: 
Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 1 n.l (1990). Ocher aspeccs of che precedent, such as 
reparacions, were caken up lacer in che phase. 
47. The war resulced in a crushing defeac of che country"s milicary junta and allowed the cransicion co 
go forward. For discussion of the Argentine crials policy, see CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON 
ThlAL (1996); see also Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The 
Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619 (1991). 
48. See Nino, supra noce 47. 
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cratic governments struggled with national militaries over the chosen justice 
policy.49 This provided a haunting reminder of the post-World War I period 
and again raised the question of whether the administration of criminal jus-
tice advanced the rule of law. In Phase II, modernization and the rule of law 
were equated with trials by the nation-state to legitimate the successor re-
gime and advance nation-building. 
Phase II manifests a similarly limited transferability to political contexts 
of radically different sovereignty as the Phase I model.so However, despite 
the general absence of international trials in Phase II, a review of the transi-
tional jurisprudence demonstrates that international law can play a construc-
tive role, providing an alternative source of rule of law to guide national 
trials in a transitional society.s 1 In this regard, international legal norms serve to 
construct a perception of continuity and consistency in the rule of law.s2 The 
profound and permanent significance of the Nuremberg model is that by 
defining the rule of law in universalizing terms, it has become the standard 
by which all subsequent transitional justice debates are framed. Whereas the 
Phase I justice policy simply assumed the legitimacy of punishing human 
rights abuses, in Phase II the tension between punishment and amnesty was 
complicated by the recognition of dilemmas inherent in periods of political 
flux. 
Transitional justice in its second phase reflected that the relevant values in 
the balance were hardly those of the ideal rule of law. Where the aim was to 
advance legitimacy, pragmatic principles guided the justice policy and the 
sense of adherence to the rule of law. Transitional jurisprudence was linked 
to a conception of justice that was imperfect and partial. What is fair and 
just in extraordinary political circumstances was to be determined from the 
transitional position itself.S3 Accordingly, multiple conceptions of justice 
emerged in Phase II. 
The deliberations over justice in transition are best understood when siru-
ated in the actual political realities and in the transitional political context, 
which included the features of the predecessor regime as well as political, 
juridical, and social contingencies. The feasibility of pursuing justice and its 
ability to contribute to transitional rule of law depended upon the scale of 
prior wrongdoings, as well as the extent to which they were systemic or 
state-sponsored. The attempt to impose accountability through criminal law 
often raised rule-of-law dilemmas, including retroactivity in the law, tam-
pering with existing laws, a high degree of prosecutorial ·selectivity, and a 
49. See Alice H. Henkin, Conference Report, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON, PAPERS AND 
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE, Nov. 4-6, 1988, WYE CENTER, MARYLAND 1 (1989). 
50. See TEITEL, supra note I, at 36-39. 
51. See id., at 20-23 (identifying and evaluating numerous instances where alternative rule of law val-
ues are drawn from international law and incorporated within the national law of transitional societies). 
52. See Alvarez, infra note 56; Schabas, infra note 56. 
53. See TEITEL, supra note 1, at 234. 
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compromised judiciary.54 Therefore, to whatever extent imposing transi-
tional criminal justice included such irregularities, it risked detracting from 
the contribution that justice can make to reestablishing the rule of law. 55 In 
fledgling democracies, where the administration of punishment can pose 
acute rule-of-law dilemmas, the contradictions to the uses of the law may 
become too great. 56 These profound dilemmas were recognized in the delib-
erations preceding the decisions in many countries to forego prosecutions in 
favor of alternative methods for truth-seeking and accountability. 57 
Given the tensions present in the administration of transitional justice in 
its second phase, the principles of justice associated with Phase I were in-
creasingly questioned. In a critical response to the Phase I postwar justice 
project, Phase II moved beyond retributive justice as historically under-
stood. The transitional dilemmas at stake in Phase II were framed in terms 
more comprehensive than simply confronting or holding accountable the 
predecessor regime, and included questions about how to heal an entire soci-
ety and incorporate diverse rule-of-law values, such as peace and reconcilia-
tion, that had previously been treated as largely external to the transitional 
justice project. Accordingly, the move away from judgment associated with 
international justice reflected a shift in the understanding of transitional 
justice, which became associated with the more complex and diverse politi-
cal conditions of nation-building. 
54. Where prosecutorial strategy singles out individuals, it often fails to adequately express condem-
nation of the system that defines the modern repressive regime, potentially defeating a core purpose of 
transitional justice. See Jon Elster, On Doing What One Can: An Arg11ment Against Post-Comm11nist Restit11tion 
and Retrib11tion, in Kritz, Sllpra note 3, at 566-68. On selective trials, compare Teitel, Transitional }11rispr11-
dence, s11pra note 4 (presenting selective trials as a limit in transitional punishment policy), with Payam 
Akhavan, }11stice in The Hag11e, Peace in the Former Y11goslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War 
Crimes Trib11nal, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 774, 774-81 (1998) (arguing for selective trials for their "truth-telling 
impact"), and Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Acco11nts: The D11ty to Prosec11te H11man Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (offering an argument in favor of selective trials as on balance 
contributing to the rule of law). 
55. See TEITEL, s11pra note 1, at 2016-30 (discussing rule of law dilemmas). 
56. See TEITEL, S11pra note 1, at 36-39, 46-51. See generally Ruti G. Teitel, Persemtion and lnq11isition: 
A Case Study, in Stotsky, S11pra note 13, at 141. Failed trials in fledgling democracies such as Rwanda 
demonstrate the conflicts between the processes of national reconciliation and criminal justice. For an 
analysis of the Rwandan judicial system and the debate over UN Security Council Resolutions to create 
an international criminal tribunal in Rwanda, see NEIL J. KRIT""L, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL RE-
PORT, RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE (A REPORT ON A UNITED STATES 
INSTITUTE FOR PEACE CONFERENCE) (1995) available at http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/rwandal.html (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2003). See also William Schabas,}11Stice, Democracy and lmp11nity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: 
Searching for Sol11tions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 551-52 (1996) (citing S.C. Res 955, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (1994)). Compare the international solution; see 
Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT0 L L. 365 (1999) (discuss-
ing the limits of international criminal tribunals). 
5 7. South Africa is a prominent example. For a discussion of the state of the South African judiciary as 
a factor in South Africa's transitional amnesty agreement, see Paul Van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional 
j11stice: The Case of So11th Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. IN"I .. L AFF. 647 (1999). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the historical role of the judiciary under apartheid, see STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN 
A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1995); David 
Dyzenhaus, Transitionalj11stice, 1 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 163 (2003). 
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The post-Cold War phase stands in a critical position relative to Phase I 
transitional justice. In the Phase II context of a heightened wave of demo-
cratic transition and nation-building, transitional justice involved crucial 
rule-of-law compromises. Therefore, whereas Phase I transitional justice ini-
tially appeared to assume its potentially limitless and universal extension in 
the law, by its second phase transitional justice was more concededly contex-
tual, limited, and provisional. Ultimately, the primary focus on local respon-
sibility in post-Cold War transitions offered a partial, distorted perspective 
of the historically broader bipolar conflict. While the Phase II reliance on 
local or national justice constituted a critical response to Phase I, the post-
Cold War model was ultimately not appropriate for later globalizing 
politics, in which national and international factors became interdependent 
contributors to political change. 
A. Juxtaposing Truth to Justice 
This Part elaborates upon the link between the chosen form of transitional 
justice response and political context. In Phase II, the central transitional 
dynamic responded to postwar transitional justice, while also differentiating 
itself from that period. Transitional justice responses in the second phase 
moved away from postwar international transitional justice toward alterna-
tive strategies. This was illustrated by the surge of hybridized law and the 
move to law and society responses. 
The leading model in this phase is known as the restorative model. In this 
phase, the main purpose of transitional justice was to construct an alterna-
tive history of past abuses. A dichotomy between truth and justice therefore 
emerged. Thus, the Phase II paradigm largely eschewed trials to focus in-
stead upon a new institutional mechanism: the truth commission. A truth 
commission is an official body, often created by a national government, to 
investigate, document, and report upon human rights abuses within a coun-
try over a specified period of time. While first used in Argentina,58 the in-
vestigatory model is now associated with the response adopted in post-
apartheid South Africa in the 1990s.59 Truth and reconciliation commissions 
of various types have since been proposed or convened throughout the world 
and often garner significant international support.60 
58. Argentina esrablished the first official transitional commission of inquiry in the modern period. 
While it was a truth commission, it was not aimed at reconciliation. Indeed, the "Nunca Mas" commis-
sion inquiry was the first stage in Argentina's post-junta justice following the collapse of the military 
regime after the Falklands war defeat. For an account, see NINO, supra note 47. See also NUNCA MAS: THE 
REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED (Farrar et al. trans, 1986). 
59. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (Truth and Recon-
ciliation Comm'n eds., 1999); Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 (1995) (S. 
Afr.) (establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission). For an in-depth account of this history 
from a biographical perspective, see ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED (2000). 
60. For a comprehensive discussion of truth commissions, see PRISCil.LA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE 
TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TimROR AND ATROCITY (2001). For a discussion of the South African 
Model, see BORAINE, supra note 59. For a critical interpretation of the truth commissions project, see 
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The appeal of the model is its ability to offer a broader historical perspec-
tive, rather than mere judgments in isolated cases.61 Truth commissions are 
most popular where the predecessor regime disappeared persons or repressed 
information about its persecution policy, as was typical in Latin America.62 
In contrast, truth commissions have been of less interest in post-Communist 
Europe, where the use of history by various governments was itself a de-
structive dimension of Communist repression.63 Accordingly, in Eastern 
Europe, the main critical response by the successor regime was not to create 
official histories but rather to guarantee access to the historical record.64 
The second phase model did appear to advance some of the rule-of-law 
aims of criminal justice in transitional societies, in which legal institutions 
were functioning under stressed transitional conditions. Seen in a genealogi-
cal perspective, the primary aim of truth commissions was not justice but 
peace. This raised the question of the expected relationship between peace 
and furthering rule of law and democracy. While proponents of the South 
African model argued that peace was a necessary precondition to democ-
racy,65 building democratic institutions was not their primary goal.66 It is 
not at all evident that short-term approaches to conflict management would 
further the rule of law.67 Nevertheless, often a truth commission's purposes 
are deemed analogous to those of criminal justice, as both trials and truth 
commissions can be understood as primarily animated by deterrence. 68 In-
TEITEL, supra noce 1, ar 77-88. 
61. See TEITEL, supra nore 1, ar 70 (discussing Foucaulrian "rrurh regimes"' and rheir inevitable asso-
ciation wirh a political regime). 
62. See Teirel, supra nore 46. See also THE REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
Th!ITH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. Berryman rrans., 1993) available at hrrp://www.nd.edu/-ndlibs/ 
eresources/erexrs/rrurh/rable_of_conrenrs.hrm (lasr visited Jan. 11, 2003). 
63. On Easr Germany and irs posr-rransirion rrearmenr of official file archives, see TINA ROSENBERG, 
THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE
0
S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM 261-394 (1996). See also TIMO-
THY GARTON ASH, THE FILE: A PERSONAL HISTORY (1998). 
64. Many counrries in rhe region have enacted laws allowing victims and orhers access ro rhe files. See 
TEITEL, supra nore 1, ar 95-103; see also Ruri Teitel, Preface, in ThUTH AND JUSTICE: THE DELICATE 
BALANCE: THE DOCUMENTATION OF PRIOR REGIMES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (1993). 
65. See BORAINE, supra nore 59; Margaret Popkin & Naomi Rohr-Arriaza, Truth as justice: Investigatory 
Commissions in Latin America, LAW AND Soc. INQUIRY, Vol. 20 (Wimer 1995); KADER ASMAL ET AL., 
RECONCILIATION THROUGH ThUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE 12-17 
(1997) (describing rhe Truth and Reconciliation Commission as "achieving justice through rrurh"). 
66. See GEORGE B1zos, No ONE TO BLAME: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 229-39 
(1998) (discussing rhe African National Congress' debate over rhe goals robe achieved by a Sourh African 
rrurh commission). 
67. For a related argumenr, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO Bos-
NIA 13-3 l(Carla A. Hesse & Robert Posr eds., 1999); see also Ruri Tei rel, Millennia! Visions: Human Rights 
at Century's End, id. 339-42. 
68. See TEITEL, supra nore 1, ar 81. The esrablishmenr of rhe rrurh commissions does nor necessarily 
imply rhar rheir invesrigarive inquiries will be rhe governmenr's complete and exclusive response ro pasr 
injusrices. For discussion of rhe Argenrine process, see NUNCA MAS, supra nore 58. In El Salvador and 
Sourh Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission confessions were traded for amnesries. See The Truth 
Commission for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador, U.N. SCOR, Annex ro 
lerrer dared 29 March 1993 from Bourros-Bourros Ghali ro President of Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/25500 (1993), available at hrrp://www.usip.org/library/rc/doc/reporrs/rc_elsalvador.hrml (lasr visited 
Jan. 11, 2003); Thomas Buergenrhal, The United Nation's Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. 
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deed, such commissions' mandates often include recommendations to pre-
vent recurrence of rights abuses.69 
The Phase II response transcended the single-minded focus on individual 
accountability in favor of a more communitarian conception. Nevertheless, 
this phase's aim was hardly a full-scale social justice project.7° Instead, tran-
sitional justice's aims in this phase shifted from the earlier goal of establish-
ing the rule of law through accountability to the goal of preserving peace. 71 
This change in emphasis redefines the understanding of the purposes of tran-
sition. 
Moreover, in this phase, the modality of transitional justice often became 
a private matter. Even when vested with government authority, transitional 
justice through truth commissions often became primarily a vehicle for vic-
tims to reconcile and recover from past harms, in consultation and with the 
assistance of various non-state actors. Transitional justice became a form of 
dialogue between victims and their perpetrators. There was a move away 
from the Phase I focus on universalizing judgment to a focus on rebuilding 
political identity72 through rule of law, premised on local understandings of 
legitimacy. 
The problem of judgment gave way to other responses, primarily national 
investigatory commissions which had the advantage of being able to inquire 
ThANSNAT'L L. 497 (1994). A counter example would be Argentina, whose rransirion commenced wirh a 
rrurh commission, which rhen led ro rhe formation of criminal jusrice policy, and finally ro prosecutions. 
On rhe Larin American agreements see WESCHLER, Jupra nore 13. Regarding rhe Sourh African arrange-
ment, see Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Acr, J/Jpra nore 59. On amnesry adjudication 
in Sourh Africa, see ThuTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, AMNESTY DECISION ThANSCRIPTS, 
available at hrrp://www.doj.gov.za/rrc/amnrrans/index.hrm (lasr visited Jan. 11, 2003). For further re-
marks on rhe reconciliation process, see Abdullah Omar, Trnth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Account-
ing for the PaJt, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5 (1997). 
69. See Popkin & Rohr-Arriaza, Jupra nore 65. 
70. Of course, rhere are exceptions. When rhe Sourh African rransirion first began, rhe African Na-
tional League sought a broader redisrriburive program. 
71. See Ruri Teirel, Bringing the MeHiah Through the Law, in HESSE & POST, Jupra nore 67, ar 177-93 
(discussing rhe conflict between rhe political business of peacemaking and rhe assertion of law in rhe 
Inrernarional Criminal Tribunal for rhe former Yugoslavia). 
72. There are a variety of related aims implied in rhis shifr, including remembering, mourning, and 
recovering. There is a growing lirerarure on rhe alrernarives ro punishment. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF 
MEMORY: ThANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES (Alexandra Barahona de Briro er al. 
eds., 2001); GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIME 
ThIBUNALS (2000); BORAINE, supra note 59; JOHN BORNEMAN, RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE AND ACCOUNT-
ABILITY IN POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE (1997); HAYNER, supra nore 60; Jennifer]. Llewellyn & Robert 
Howse, Institutions for Restorative justice: the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation CommisJion, 49 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 355 (1999); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NA-
TIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2001); A. JAMES MCADAMS, JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED 
GERMANY (2001); THE (UN)RULE OF LAW & THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA Quan E. Men-
dez er al. eds., 1999); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MAss VIOLENCE (1998); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, 
AND THE LAW (1997); Popkin & Rohr-Arriaza, Jupra nore 65; MARGARET POPKIN, PEACE WITHOUT 
JUSTICE: OBSTACLES TO BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN EL SALVADOR (2000); ThUTH V. JUSTICE: THE 
MORALITY OF ThUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rorberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000); DESMOND 
IMPILO TuTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (1999); RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF 
ThUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001). 
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more systematically into a state's wrongdoings.73 Despite the move away 
from the international criminal justice associated with the first phase, the 
Phase II response did incorporate the postwar model's human rights rheto-
ric, albeit in a broader, societal, restorative approach. The central dilemma 
associated with this phase was often framed in human rights terms, such as 
whether victims had rights to truth, and whether the state had a duty to 
investigate in order to reveal truth.74 Within this framework, the core dy-
namic of "truth versus justice" suggested that there existed necessary conflicts 
among justice, history, and memory. This dynamic formulation is best un-
derstood as a critical response to the prior postwar model. However, the at-
tempt to accommodate the international human rights rhetoric to a variety 
of broader social aims raises a number of contradictions and risks its likely 
misappropriation. 75 
However limited, transitional justice in its second phase enabled a form of 
preservative justice. The Phase II response allowed for the creation of a his-
torical record while also leaving open the possibility of future judicial reso-
lution. The emphasis on preservation conceded the existing constraints upon 
political sovereignty associated with modern democratization, globalizing 
political fragmentation, and other limiting political conditions at the core of 
contemporary transitional justice. 
B. Trading justice for Peace 
A dynamic discourse that juxtaposed and even sacrificed the aim of justice 
for the more modest goal of peace emerged in Phase II.76 This Part elabo-
rates upon that discourse and reflects upon its place in the genealogy, largely 
in terms of its critical dynamic with the Phase I justice model. This Part 
ultimately contends that the Phase II model expanded the category of transi-
tional justice, with implications for its future normalization.77 
A jurisprudence of forgiveness78 and reconciliation79 is associated with the 
Phase II model. The truth and reconciliation project incorporated much of 
73. For a comprehensive account of recent truth commissions and for an argument advocating investi-
gation, see HAYNER, supra note 60; see also Kritz, supra note 3. 
74. See Popkin & Rohe-Arriaza, supra note 65, at 79; see also Rorberg & Thompson, supra note 72. Cer-
tainly there is no necessary conflict between investigation and justice, as is reflected in the first truth 
commission, convened during Argentina's 1983 political transition. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 58, 
preface. 
75. For an argument that there is such an obligation, see Velasquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 35, 
at ~ 166, OEA/ser. LN/llI.19, doc. 13 (1988) ("[T]he state must prevent, investigate and punish any 
violation of the rights recognized by the convention and ... restore the right violated and provide com-
pensation as warranted."). See a/Jo Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992). 
76. See TEITEL, supra note I, at 51. 
77. See discussion infra at Part III. 
78. See TuTU, supra note 72, at 260; MINOW, supra note 72; JACQUES DERRIDA, ON COSMOPOLITAN-
ISM AND FORGIVENESS 55-59 (Mark Dooley & Michael Hughes trans., 2001). 
79. For a thoughtful philosophical justification of restorative justice, see Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambi-
tions Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Re.storative justice, in Rotberg & Thompson, supra 
note 72, at 68. 
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its normative discourse from outside the law, specifically from ethics, medi-
cine, and theology.Bo Its purpose was not merely justice, but peace for both 
individuals and society as a whole.Bl The problem of transitional justice was 
reconceived across rrioral and psychological lines to redefine identity. The 
evident mix of legal, political, and religious language reflected both the con-
ceit and the limits of the law. Phase II had its roots in Phase I and consti-
tuted a critical response to the broader postwar justice project. Whereas in 
its first phase the problem of transitional justice was framed in terms of jus-
tice versus amnesty, with amnesty considered exceptional to general adher-
ence to the rule of law, the second phase adopted a broader amnesty policy 
with the aim of reconciliation.B2 The exception became generalized and reflected 
an explicit attempt to incorporate both mercy and grace into the law. 
Both political activism and scholarship sought to move outside contem-
porary politics and history to represent conflict in timeless and universal 
terms.83 Phase II did not resist the universalizing impetus associated with 
Phase 1.84 There was some continuation of the Phase I norm of deployment 
of universal rights as part of the justifying structure of Phase II. The form of 
law adopted offers a universalizing language about the aims of forgiveness 
and the possibility of political redemption.B5 While law as conventionally 
understood had almost disappeared, the alternative model was said to have 
universal applications and claimed general diffusion around the world.86 
Consider the extent to which the transitional justice being exported in the 
post-Cold War paradigm is a secularized religion without law.B7 
80. For a discussion of the turn to therapeutic language, see MINOW, supra note 72, at 21-22; 
Kenneth Roth & Alison Desforges,justice or Therapy?, BosTON REV., Summer 2002, available at http:// 
bostonreview.mit.edu/BR27 .3/rothdesforges.html. For an historical accounr of the turn to moral and 
religious language, see infra note 87; ASMAL ET AL., supra note 65, at 25. 
81. On the uses of justice to advance peace, see Teitel, supra note 71, at 177-93. The Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission confronred "crucial questions of moral and political responsibility." AsMAL ET 
AL., supra note 65, at 25. Compare Popkin & Rohr-Arriaza, supra note 65 (truth as route to peace), with 
Akhavan, supra note 54 (trials as route to peace). See HAYNER, supra note 60, at 134-35 (discussing com-
plicated results of truth commissions for the aim of individual healing). 
82. Most of the amnesties are pursuanr to legislation, as in much of Latin America's Southern Cone. 
See Teitel, supra note 46. Others, as in South Africa, are handled on an individual basis but still pursuant 
to a broader transitional amnesty project. See supra note 59. 
83. For example, there is an explosion of writing on the subject of evil. See, e.g., ALAN BADIOU, ETH-
ICS: AN ESSAY ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL (2001); SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: 
AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (2002); JOHN KEKES, FACING EVIL (1990). 
84. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 11 (discussing Nuremberg and the development of the univer-
sal human rights movement); see also HENKIN, supra note 38. 
85. Indeed, this aim is made clear in the Truth Commission Reports. See TEITEL, supra note 1, at 69-
72. 
86. See BORAINE, supra note 59. 
87. On the link between the corruption of political and legal authority and the move ro moral and re-
ligious authority, see BORAINE, supra note 59, 340-78; see also LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA (Charles Villa-
Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000) (discussing the religious character of South Africa's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). 
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In Phase II, there was an apparent conflation of the realm of ethics, gener-
ally considered to involve the private sphere rather than public choices,88 
and the realm of the political. This signaled the breakdown and interconnec-
tion of the private and the public spheres, a phenomenon associated with 
globalization.89 Further, in the second phase, the relevant political actors 
changed from those with legal and political authority to those with moral 
authority in civil society. Whereas in its first phase justice was chiefly the 
purview of the successor regime and courts of law, in the second phase many 
of the relevant actors and institutions lay outside law and politics, and in-
cluded churches, NGOs, and human rights groups that incorporated a vari-
ety of alternative forms of conflict resolution.9° 
Moreover, the Phase II model adhered only tenuously to conventional le-
gal processes. This was illustrated by the move from the courtroom to the 
hearing room and the turn to discursive confessional testimonials. The 
choice of language had significant juridical and political implications. An 
ethical-religious discourse injected a moral basis into transitional justice. Yet 
the truth and reconciliation movement tended to eschew judgment and in-
stead aimed to move beyond legal notions of guilt and responsibility. It con-
tributed a political theology,91 building a discourse that incorporated moral 
imperatives and had the potential to threaten the parameters of legitimate 
political discourse in liberalizing states, which conceives of the public sphere 
as a realm of free contestation.92 Nevertheless, the truth commission was also 
associated with critical responses to globalization, where the perceived 
democratic deficit has led to the pursuit of a universalizing and legitimizing 
discourse. 93 
The evolution of the transitional justice discourse in the second phase 
highlighted a complex interaction between the dimensions of the universal, 
the global, and the local. While framing the problem in universalizing hu-
man rights terms suggested a form of justice that is abstracted from the in-
terests and needs of societies, even the Phase II approach assumed conditions 
not formally present in many countries, with often dubious restorative re-
88. On che broader developments at this time roward an ethically driven public discourse, see THE 
TuRN TO ETHICS (Marjorie B. Garber et al. eds., 2000); see also ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, POSTMODERN ETH-
ICS (1993). 
89. See DAVID HELD, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE (1999); 
ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? (Patrick Camiller trans., 2000). 
90. See infra notes 120, 123. 
91. On political theology, see CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CON-
CEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 1985). On the relationship of religion and violence, see 
HENT DE VRIES, RELIGION AND VIOLENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM KANT TO DERRIDA 
(2002); see also )ACOB TAUBES, DIE POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE DES PAULUS (Aleida Assman er al. eds., 
1993). For a related argument, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38-78 (U. Chi. Press 2d 
ed. 1998) (1958) (exploring the distinctions between the public and the private realms). 
92. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATION-
ALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1985). 
93. The emergence of this form of transitional justice discourse at this time reflects its association 
with the politics of globalization, and the related challenges to the maintenance of a robust public sphere. 
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suits. Genealogical review illuminates the historical and political contingen-
cies in the policy choices. It also shows the extent to which the Phase II ju-
ridical regime incorporated rule-of-law ideas that related closely to the le-
gitimacy of local institutions, thus addressing the multiple aims associated 
with periods of political flux. 
The politics associated with the post-Cold War transitional response are 
illustrative. The asserted aim of transitional policy was said to be the thresh-
old goal of peace rather than democracy. The turn to alternative strategies, 
whether theological or therapeutic, was animated by the forward-looking aim of 
reconciliation. Forgiveness became a distinctive form of political apology,94 
understood as an act of contrition in a realm of unity politics.95 A variety of 
conciliatory mechanisms emerged in many transitional societies, with the 
ostensible aim of stabilizing internal politics. These policies became the 
signs of an age of restoration of the rule of law in a global politics. 
Nevertheless, there may well be long-term negative consequences to this 
type of reconciliation politics. For example, instigation of the settlement of 
claims can have conservative ramifications. The focus may subvert broader 
political reform96 and generally cannot assist in laying the basis for devel-
opment of democracy.97 Moreover, as the responses discussed here have 
mostly implied national political resolutions, they often missed the broader 
structural causation associated with the bipolar balance of power. The Phase 
II discourse was being renegotiated at the same time as the debate on glob-
alization reform. This appears to be more than historical coincidence. Even 
as the disparities between rich and poor associated with the free market 
economy have grown,98 the impetus has been to resort increasingly to the 
transitional justice discourse and a project that is to some extent backward-
looking and limited to restoration.99 Presently, the extent to which transi-
94. For a discussion of some of the philosophical and sociological implications of forgiveness, see 
NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION (1993); see also 
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1990); Michel Rolph-Trouillot, 
Abortive Rituals: Historical Apologies in the Global Era, in INTERVENTIONS: RIGHTING WRONGS, RE-
WRITING HISTORY, vol. 2(2), at 171-86 (H. Bhabha & R. S. Rajan, eds., 2000). 
95. On the role of forgiveness in the political sphere, see ARENDT, supra note 91, at 236-43. On 
South Africa, see BORAINE, supra note 59, 340-78, at 340-78 (discussing the need for "(f]acing up to 
collective responsibility"). On the expected role of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, see ASMAL ET AL., supra note 65, at 143. 
96. Compare Robert Meister, The Politics and Political Uses of Human Rights Discourse: A Conference on 
Rethinking H11man Rights, paper presented at conference at Columbia (Nov. 8-9, 2001) (focusing on the 
model's effect upon the revolurionary project, rather than the democracy building project), with Jung & 
Shapiro, infra note 97. 
97. In South Africa, the politics of reconciliation was associated with the politics of consociationalism. 
See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 15, § 251 (1993) (the "National Unity and Reconciliation" provision); Courtney 
Jung & Ian Shapiro, South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional 
Order, 23 POL. & Soc. 269 ( 1995 ). 
98. For a discussion of current tensions in the globalization of rhe market, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITL, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
99. For a discussion of some of the contradictions, see Meister, supra note 96. 
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tional justice has displaced other justice projects signals chastened political 
expectations responding to the failed experiments of a not so distant past. 
C. F in-de-S iecle Transitional} ustice and the Passage of Time 
This Part examines transitional justice over time. It explores the degree to 
which the discourse of transitional justice has become ever-present in poli-
tics. With apparently ongoing processes of transitional justice delayed, the 
very meaning of the category of transition has expanded over time to become 
a persistent trope. Loo 
The developments described above have implications for human historical 
self-understanding. By the end of the twentieth century, it seemed that all 
justice had become transitional, ex post, and backward-looking. Among some 
theorists of the period, the post-Soviet dynamics and the related wave of 
transitions were expected to lead to political stabilization and, according to 
Francis Fukuyama, "the end of history."IOL Other theorists suggested that 
the Communist collapse left few political choices, and that therefore politics 
was past and all that remained was history. Thus, Jacques Derrida wrote 
about Marxism as a "ghost" to be mourned. 102 And while Derrida and Fuku-
yama shared little in the way of politics, they reflected a broad span of po-
litical writers whose work at century's end clearly memorialized a time when 
politics involved a pronounced revolutionary project. L03 However, these con-
clusions forecasting the end of history or the end of politics certainly seem 
inapposite. L04 Existing scholarship has not yet captured the prevailing dy-
namic of transitional justice or its nexus with ongoing political change. 
The persistent discourse of the final years of the twentieth century was 
that of transitional justice. Developments seeking closure, associated with 
both the end of century and the end of millennium, reflected a pervasive 
sense of metatransition. At century's end, there was an evident increase of 
facing old injustices and of transitional justice delayed. There were persis-
tent calls for apologies, reparations, memoirs, and all manner of account-
settling related to past suffering and wrongdoing. Los Examples of claim-
100. On the normalization of transitional justice, see infra Pare IIl(A) and notes 130-147. 
101. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
102. See JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURN-
ING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994) (discussing the remains of Marxism 
after che fall of communism). 
103. But see ERIC HOBSBAWM, ON THE EDGE OF THE NEW CENTURY 95-107 (Allan Cameron trans., 
Antonio Polito ed., 2000) (discussing che changes in che meaning of the political discussion of lefr and 
righc and in particular "progressive"' policies). 
104. Indeed, there is an evident pose-Soviet fragmentation and disaggregation. For an argument that 
che contemporary world today appears more violent, see KEN Jow1TT, NEW WORLD DISORDER (1992). 
For discussion of the role of law in circumstances of apparent perpetual conllicc, see Ruti Teitel, Human-
ity's Law: Rule of Law in the New Glohal Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 352 (2002). 
105. See generally John Torpey, Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: Reflections on Reparations, 73]. 
Moo. HIST. 333, 334 (2001) (discussing the global spread of "reparations policies"); Sharon K. Hom & 
Eric K. Yamamoco, Symposium, Race and the Law at the Turn of the Century: Collective Memory, History, and 
Socia/justice, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1747 (2000). 
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making and settlements abounded, including those related to assets and 
property lost during World War II, 106 reparations for slave labor, 107 and even 
more ancient injustices such as colonization, the Inquisition, and the Cru-
sades.108 
As a genealogical perspective illustrates, interest in the pursuit of justice 
does not necessarily wane with the passage of time. 109 This may be because 
transitional justice relates to exceptional political conditions, where the state 
itself is implicated in wrongdoing and the pursuit of justice necessarily 
awaits a change in regime. In recent years, this has been characterized by 
some as the "Scilingo Effect," for a confession given two decades after junta 
rule ended in Argentina that reopened the question of justice for crimes 
committed during the dirty war. 110 Transitional justice implies a non-linear 
approach to time. This phenomenon is reflected in legal responses taken, 
often in the form of delayed litigation, to extend the scope of transitional 
justice litigation on a case-by-case basis. 111 In the international sphere, this 
dilemma was resolved by the adoption of the UN Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, although this did not necessarily resolve the attendant political 
tensions. 112 
There is a complicated relationship between transitional justice, truth, 
and history. In the transitional justice discourse, revisiting the past is under-
stood as the way to move forward. 11 3 There is an implied notion of progres-
sive history. As a matter of intellectual historiography and human self-
understanding, this notion is under siege. 114 However, transitions are rare 
106. On the Holocaust as a standard and globalized model, see Torpey, supra note 105, at 338-42. See 
also Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2002); 
Anthony Sebok, Prosaic justice, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 51-53; Anthony Sebok, The Brooklyn 
Slavery Class Action: More than just a Political Gambit (Apr. 9, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
sebok/20020409.html (Findlaw's Legal Commentary); WHEN SORRY IsN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTRO-
VERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999). 
l 07. Declaration of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, Durban, South Africa (31 August-8 September 2001), at http:i/193.194.138.190/ 
pdf/Durban.pdf. 
108. For historical discussion, see for example ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITU-
TION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2002); JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORDS OF THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (Peter Irons ed., 1989); see generally ERIC YAMAMOTO ET AL., 
RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001). 
109. Compare Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, n.1 (1992) (arguing for 
"succession" of claims) with TEITEL, supra note 1, at 138-39 (discussing the paradox of the passage of 
time as concerns transitional justice, which generally involves state wrongdoing). 
110. See MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR (1988) (discussing Argentina's "Scilingo 
Effect" of justice delayed). 
111. See infra note 124 (regarding the Pinochet litigation). 
112. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 
(1968). 
113. Indeed, this notion appears throughout the truth commission literature. In South Africa, the role 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was envisioned as a "bridge" between the past and the 
future. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 15, § 251 (1993) (the "National Unity and Reconciliation" provision). 
114. For the most part such notions of history are associated with now largely passe perfectionist proj-
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periods of rupture which offer a choice among contested narratives. The 
paradoxical goal in transition is to undo history. The aim is to reconceive the 
social meaning of past conflicts, particularly defeats, in an attempt to recon-
struct their present and future effects. 11 5 
Transitions present a threshold choice. By definition they are times of con-
testation in historical narratives. Transitions thus present the potential for 
counter-histories. The question is posed anew after the passage of time, 
which underscores the threshold challenge of remaining in history as well as 
the limits to transformation. Indeed, the possibility of some minimal ame-
lioration is often juxtaposed with the countervailing resistance to working 
within historical and political parameters for the possibility of change. The 
notion of a threshold choice following massive tragedy appears in works 
chiefly addressing responses to the Holocaust. 116 In this context, there is 
often resistance to the very idea of a transition, which would raise the possi-
bility of political change. The problem concerns the propriety of further 
engagement after massive catastrophe, whether in the form of giving testi-
mony, taking political action, or contributing scholarship. 117 
In the post-Cold War phase, historical production was fundamental to 
building a state's political identity, 118 and control over construction of an 
alternative history could lie with multiple actors, including historians, law-
yers, journalists, and victims. 11 9 This raised the normative question of who 
should write the history of the transition. In this regard, Phase II transi-
tional justice moved from a project dependent upon the leading role of the 
state to a process that often elided it. The devolution of state power reflected 
the broader political conditions associated with post-Cold War transitions 
and globalization. Given the fact that predecessor regimes were frequently 
implicated in past wrongdoing, the diminished role for political authority in 
Phase II managed to avoid many of the dilemmas associated with the more 
ambitious Phase I justice project. 
ects such as Marxism. For a later critical presentation, see Walter Benjamin, TheseJ on the Philosophy of 
History, in ILLUMINATIONS: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS 253-64, at 257 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968) (op-
posing progressive hisrorical thought); see also FOUCAULT, supra note 7 (distinguishing genealogy from 
progressive histories). 
115. On the notion of "working through history" or "vergangenheitsbewaltigung," see Marc Silber-
man, Writing What-for Whom? 'Vergangenheits Gewii!tigung' in GDR Literature, 10 GERMAN STUD. REV. 
527, n.3 (1987); Richard Evans, The New Nationalism and the Old History: PerspectiveJ on the West German 
Historikerstreit, 59]. OF Moo. HIST. 761, 785 n.4 (1987); see also Gordon Craig, The War of the German 
Historians, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 15, 1987, at 16-19; CHARLES MAIER, THE UNMASTERABLE PAST 
(1988). 
116. See JEAN AMERY, AT THE MINo's LIMITS: CONTEMPLATIONS BY A SURVIVOR ON AUSCHWITZ 
AND ITS REALITIES (Stella P. Rosenfeld & Sidney Rosenfeld trans., 1980). 
117. On the problem of post-Holocaust representation, in scholarly writing in particular, see for ex-
ample PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE FINAL SOLUTION (Saul Friedlander 
ed., 1992). 
118. See TEITEL, supra note 1, at 77-92. 
119. On victims· testimony, see LAWRENCE L. LANGER, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIALS: THE RUINS OF 
MEMORY (1993); MINOW, supra note 73. 
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This transforming context increased the possibility of various alternative 
and even competing transitional justice resolutions involving international, 
transnational, national, or private settlements. In Phase II, there were a host 
of new political actors120 and a distinct privatization of the transitional re-
sponse. The trend toward privatization took a number of forms, from its 
devolution to civil society to its relegation to private citizens via litiga-
tion.121 These processes were partially related to globalization, and raised the 
question of the extent to which normative principles were available to guide 
transitional decision-making. The second phase policy reflected a struggle 
between local and global resolutions, even as globalization increased the in-
terconnectedness of political decision-making. Genealogical, interdiscipli-
nary, and comparative review reveals highly divergent approaches to the rule 
of law, 122 which in turn reflect different legal and cultural perspectives. 123 A 
profound normative question was raised in the interaction of transitional 
justice, globalization, and sovereignty: whether and to what extent the re-
sponse to a harm should rightly remain under the control of the state where 
the harm occurred. In Phase II, actions related to transitional justice were 
increasingly taken independent of state actors. This unsettled earlier deter-
minations, as illustrated in the landmark extradition case of General Augu-
sto Pinochet. 124 Moreover, this case also demonstrated the expansion of tran-
sitional justice in time. 125 In a world that is increasingly economically, tech-
nologically, politically, and juridically interdependent, profound questions 
arise at the intersection of the principles of jurisdiction and sovereignty. 
Given the ongoing processes of globalization, this phenomenon will likely 
accelerate. 126 This seems to portend an expanded category of transitional 
justice. 
120. On the growing role of transnational networks, see Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Inter-
national Norms Dynamic and Political Change, 52 INT'L 0RG. 887, 907 (1998); MARGARETH KECK & 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
(1998). 
121. This is seen in rhe contemporary proliferation of lawsuits against multinationals. See Developments 
in the Law-International Criminal Law: II. The Promises of International Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957 
(2001). On the problem of the relationship between state and individual responsibility, see STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATIONS IN INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Albrecht Randlezhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds., 1999); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Democracy, 
Law, and Comparative Politics, 36 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 7 (2001). 
122. Whereas the U.S. approach tends to delegate resolution of controversies to case-by-case litiga-
tion, the European approach generally focuses on rulemaking through legislation. For a comparative 
discussion of illustrations of the transitional rule of law, see TEITEL, supra note 1. 
123. One illustration of these differences in transitional justice is postwar litigation, chiefly regarding 
the Holocaust, which has occasioned a reaction against the supposed export of the "American" approach 
to injury abroad. 
124. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Mag., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) 1 A.C. 147 
(2000). 
125. For discussion of the relation of transitional justice to the passage of time, see supra text accom-
panying note 109. 
126. For commentary on the potential of universal jurisdiction, see infra note 138; see generally Hu-
MAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2001 WORLD REPORT, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/index.html (last visited Jan. 
13, 2003). 
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The association of post-Cold War transitional justice with a globalizing 
politics acutely reflected the constructivist dimension of the more limited 
Phase II approaches. Whereas the first phase conceived of the rule of law in 
universalizing terms associated with accountability for humanity, the Phase 
II model was instead concerned with advancing an opposing idea of the rule 
of law associated with the legitimacy of a country's national jurisdiction and 
sovereignty. This Phase II narrowing of the relevant scope of inquiry illumi-
nated the political construction that correlated with this form of transitional 
justice, specifically responses that implicated local rather than international 
actors, and those lower rather than higher in the echelon of political respon-
sibility and power. This signaled the Phase II response's constructive force 
and also showed the extent to which the Phase II model was amenable to 
politicization and ultimately depended upon promoting alternative values, 
besides universal rights and accountability, underlying the rule of law. 
To the extent that the second phase moved away from traditional legal 
remedies, it challenged whether any threshold remained regarding what 
constitutes the predicate transitional rule of law. 127 These changes illustrate 
the normative implications of deploying a discourse of justice. The discourse 
can influence the legitimacy of the response by giving it the provenance and 
hence the democratic accountability of the successor regime, and by imput-
. ing the administration of the transitional response with the legality tradi-
tionally associated with judicial proceedings. 128 The question remains 
whether there are any transitional justice baselines or any threshold mini-
mum beyond which historical, psychological, or religious inquiry ought to 
be characterized as justice-seeking. This genealogical review suggests that 
the relevant inquiry is not a metaphysical enterprise, but rather must be 
understood in its historical and political context. Still, there is an independ-
ent basis for critique which influences the nature of the emerging discourse 
and affects whether it is likely to simply assist in the immediate aim of 
conflict resolution or also contribute to the goals of democracy, nation-
building, and the advancement of liberal political aims. 129 
III. PHASE III: STEADY-STATE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
A. Transitional Justice All the Time 
The present phase can be characterized as steady-state transitional justice. 
The discourse has now moved from the periphery to the center. As discussed 
above, the new millennium appears to be associated with the expansion and 
normalization of transitional justice. What was historically viewed as a legal 
127. See TEITEL, supra nore 1, ar 213-28 (promoting an explicidy transitional rule of law char is nor 
merely symbolic). 
128. See H. 1. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2nd ed. 1997); see also HENKIN, supra note 38, ar 31-
41. 
129. On the evolution of transitional justice, see TEITEL, supra note 1, ar 223-28. 
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phenomenon associated with extraordinary post-conflict conditions now in-
creasingly appears to be a reflection of ordinary times. War in a time of peace, l30 
political fragmentation, weak states, small wars, and steady conflict all char-
acterize contemporary political conditions. 131 These contemporary develop-
ments have spurred the attempted normalization of transitional justice, 
leading ultimately to ambivalent consequences. As a jurisprudence associ-
ated with political flux, transitional justice is related to a higher politiciza-
tion of the law and to some degree of compromise in rule-of-law standards. 
The most recognized symbol of the normalization of transitional jurispru-
dence is the entrenchment of the Phase I response in the form of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court ("ICC"), the new international institution established 
at the end of the twentieth century.132 This court was preceded by the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals convened to respond to genocidal conflicts 
in the Balkans and Rwanda. 133 Half a century after World War II, the ICC 
symbolizes the entrenchment of the Nuremberg Model: the creation of a 
permanent international tribunal appointed to prosecute war crimes, geno-
cide, and crimes against humanity as a routine matter under international 
law. 134 The threshold global rule of law presently appears to be based on an 
expansion of the law of war.135 Indeed, the move back to international hu-
manitarian law incorporates the complex relationship between the individ-
ual and the state as a legal scheme which enables the international commu-
nity to hold a regime's leadership accountable and condemn a systematic 
persecutory policy, even outside the relevant state. 136 Further, this particular 
form of international justice offers the potential for regime delegitimation 
that can support or even instigate transition. 137 Nevertheless, there are also 
130. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, WAR IN A TIME OF PEACE: BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE GENERALS 
(2001). 
131. For a more thorough discussion of law and politics in the post-September 11 polirical context, 
see Teitel, supra note 104. 
132. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) reprinted in 
3 7 I.L.M. 999 (1998) (hereinafter Rome Stature]. 
133. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704/Annexes (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. 
SCOR, 48rh Sess., 3217rh Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by V.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1166 (1998); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49rh Sess., 3453rd Mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), annexed to V.N. Doc. S/IN-F/50 (1996). For discussion of the expectations 
of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, see Teitel, supra note 71. For discussion of these tribunals' 
constraints, see Alvarez, supra note 56 (discussing the limits on international tribunals). 
134. See Rome Stature, supra note 132, Preamble, at 1002 (affirming that "the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must nor go unpunished"). 
135. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Annex 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), 
available at hrrp://www.un.org/icc. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
13 7. See Teitel, supra note 71 (discussing the limited normative potential of such off-sire tribunals); see 
also Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT0 L 
ORG. 655, 684-85 (2001). Indeed, this is something of the theory for the Milosevic trial, in light of the 
Kosovo Commission's conclusion that the NATO intervention in the conflict was "illegal but legici-
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many dilemmas and limits raised by the turn to the law of war in relative 
peacetime, as well as by the preference for international legal regimes. A 
dynamic tension emerges among adjudicatory fragmentation, the attendant 
potential for universal jurisdiction associated with transitional justice, l3B and 
the attempted centralization of accountability in the ICC. 139 
The normalization of transitional justice currently takes the form of the 
expansion of the law of war, as illustrated by the rise of humanitarian law. 140 
Contemporary developments involve an appropriation of the discourse of the 
humanitarian law regime with twofold significance. The establishment of 
humanitarian law as the present rule of law constrains not only the conduct 
of war, 141 but also appears to expand the humanitarian regime to address 
broader aspects of the law of war, including the justification of its possible 
initiation. Further, the use of the international humanitarian regime to jus-
tify the NATO intervention in Kosovo appears to have established a prece-
dent for expanding the legitimate bases for intervention, specifically a hu-
manitarian basis for just war. 142 A juridical scheme in which the law of war 
forms the basis for international criminal justice resonates more deeply and 
offers a more thorough justificatory structure. Whether unilaterally or mul-
tilaterally, the expanded humanitarian law enables recognition of lapses in 
state action, but also appears to enforce state respect for human rights. This 
demonstrates the potential for sliding from a normalized transitional justice 
to the campaign against terrorism. The use of human rights law and the law 
of war has shifted after the move away from modern state theory to the pe-
riod of globalization. The contemporary conflation of human rights law, 
criminal law, and the international law of war implies a pronounced loss for 
those seeking to challenge state action. Through the use of the transformed 
law of war and its rights enforcement scheme as a basis for intervention, the 
mate." THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT (2001), 
available at http://www.kosovocommission.org. 
138. Certainly it is the legacy of Phase I postwar justice that is amplified in the globalizing context 
where greater international interconnectedness allows for the pursuit of offenders regardless of status or 
citizenship. See PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001); Kenneth c. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under Inter-
national Law, 66 Tux. L. REV. 785 (1988). On the effect of universal jurisdiction, compare Andrea Bian-
chi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EuR.]. INT0 L L. 237 (1999), with Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129 
(1999). 
139. On the prospective role of the ICC and its likely interaction with domestic transitional justice, 
see Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 
88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000); Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 427 
(2002). On a related point regarding the Pinochet precedent, see Richard]. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet: 
International Crimes in Spanish Domestic Law, 21 HuM. RTS. Q. 927 (1999) (discussing implications of 
universality). 
140. For elaboration of this current development, see Teitel, supra note 104. 
141. On this distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bello, which has given rise to modern humani-
tarian law, see STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCI-
PLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET (Christophe Swinarsky ed., 1984). On jus ad bello, see MICHAEL WAL-
ZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (1977). 
142. See THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, supra note 137. 
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expanded humanitarian regime introduces new human rights dilemmas that 
bring to the surface the tension in the aims of justice and peace. 
Under the label of "preemptive self-defense," a related discourse of appar-
ently constant war is currently being appropriated to legitimate the next 
stage in the war on terrorism. 143 The rhetoric attempts to eviscerate the dis-
tinctions between war and peace, and between law and its exception. The 
notion of Phase III steady-state transitional justice is evident in the deploy-
m.ent of the humanitarian regime, which has expanded and merged with the 
law of human rights. 144 The appeal to a language of universal morality in 
humanitarian legal discourse resonates with recent developments in transi-
tional justice. The apparent normalization of transitional justice is also evi-
dent in the toleration of greater political discretion, 145 politicization in the 
uses of justice, the rise of highly irregular procedures, and explicit depar-
tures from prevailing law, 146 all justified in humanitarian terms. 147 
The expansion of the transitional justice discourse to the issue of terrorism 
proves problematic due to the inadequacy of the analogies between terrorism 
and war or political crisis. Transitional justice tends to look backward in 
responding to the last conflict, and therefore it does not adapt easily to use 
as a template to guarantee prospective security. Any attempt to generalize 
from exceptional post-conflict situations in order to guide politics as a mat-
ter of course becomes extremely problematic. 
Resisting the normalization of transitional justice is difficult. There is a 
significant loss in vocabulary from which to make any critique, since in the 
expanded discourse of transitional justice the law of war has merged with 
the law of human rights. Only time will tell whether and to what extent 
these developments pose a serious challenge to the rule of law or are associ-
ated with the present cycle of contemporary politics. 
B. Transitional Justice: Discontinuity Versus Continuity 
The remaining question that follows, given current trends in normaliza-
tion, is what a genealogical perspective of transitional justice might convey 
about the conception of justice in ordinary times. To what extent is there 
continuity, and to what extent discontinuity, both descriptively and norma-
tively? In recent years the question has been controversial, sparking a prolif-
143. See RICHARD TucK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 22-25 (1999) (discussing the historical 
justifications for preemptive attacks in the law of empire). 
144. On this development, see Teitel, supra note 104. 
145. This is seen in the lack of precise definition of the "enemy," other than in terms of executive dis-
cretion. See Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, at 
§ l(e), 66 Fed. Reg. 57 ,833, 57 ,834 (2001) (military order of Nov. 13, 2001). 
146. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997). Compare with discussion of 
characteristics of rule of law in transition, see TEITEL, supra note 1, at 11-26. 
147. On the general decline in adherence ro the rule of law during this period, see Ruti G. Teitel, Em-
pire's Law: Foreign Relations by Presidential Fiat, in SEPTEMBER 11 TH: ThANSFORMATIVE MOMENT? CUL-
TURE, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (Mary Dudziak ed., 2003). 
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eration of scholarly writing. A number of scholars have challenged any con-
ceptualization of transitions as exceptional in political life, claiming that the 
aspiration during transitional periods ought to be based on a general theory 
about the rule of law. 148 
This Article's genealogical review of the phenomena of transitional jus-
tice-seeking in periods of substantial political change suggests that this is a 
false dichotomy. Two political dimensions determine what signifies rule of 
law in periods of transition: the transitional context, specifically the circum-
stances relating to political and legal conditions associated with periods of 
political change, and other political factors, such as local context. Beyond 
the dimension of transition, local factors also affect the legitimacy of transi-
tional responses. Thus, the mere exportation of ideal rule-of-law models does 
not provide sufficient guidance. While there is no clear boundary between 
ordinary and transitional periods, justice-seeking in periods of transition is 
differentiated by the rule of law associated with limited conditions of politi-
cal flux. The central dilemma of transitional justice relates to the recurring 
issues that, even if not sui generis, are largely associated with the legal and 
political factors common to unstable periods of liberalizing political trans-
formation.149 To the extent that these political conditions are present in a 
successor regime, the circumstances will present rule-of-law challenges that 
are peculiar to or arise more frequently in the transitional context. There-
fore, while in the abstract it might be desirable to insist that justice-seeking 
projects in transitional times emulate those of established liberal democra-
cies, this exhortation will ultimately be of limited normative guidance. The 
rule of law capacity of transitional societies cannot be expected to function at 
the same level as states that have a consolidated liberal juridical apparatus. 
Transitional periods, depending on the political and legal conditions in 
the relevant society, will fall somewhere along the continuum of the rule-of-
law-established democracies. This observation should have implications for 
the impetus to entrench any particular form of transitional rule of law. To 
some extent, the dilemmas of transitional justice in its contemporary phases 
raise issues that resonate more generally with the efforts to establish rule of 
law in a globalizing world. These include how to shape law reform and jus-
tice projects in light of growing global interdependence, and to what extent 
to accommodate local structures to outside forces. 15° 
148. See Martin Krygier, Transitional Questions about the Rule of Law: Why, What and How?, Presented 
before the Conference of the East Central Europe Institute for Advanced Study, Budapest (L'Europe du 
Centre Est. Eine wissenschaftliche Zeirschrift at Collegium Budapest) (Feb. 15-17, 2001); Dyzenhaus, 
supra note 5 7. 
149. See TEITEL, supra note 1, at 11-18, 33-36. 
150. See STIGLITZ, supra note 98. For discussion of globalization's effect on the third world, see Tina 
Rosenberg, Globalization, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 18, 2002, § 6, at 28. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article provides a genealogy of transitional justice over the arc of the 
past half-century. The genealogical perspective situates transitional justice in 
a political context, moving away from essentializing approaches and thereby 
illuminating the dynamic relationship between transitional justice and poli-
tics over time. 
The genealogical inquiry highlights the relationship between juridical 
and political conditions during periods of political transformation. This in-
quiry indicates that transitional justice, while contingent upon local condi-
tions and culture, also displays dimensions commonly associated with peri-
ods of political flux. 
The genealogical approach contributes a needed perspective on the post-
war model's enduring dominance in the field of transitional justice. It also 
illuminates the critical move in Phase II toward local, alternative approaches 
associated with nation-building and highlights the Phase II privatization 
and hybridization of the law, which also reflects trends in globalization. The 
post-Cold War focus on alternative methods for changing political identity 
was a strategy that responded critically to the post-World War II movement 
to internationalize and universalize the rule of law, but the strategy was also 
closely related to the particular national politics of the immediate post-Cold 
War moment. Change was therefore inevitable: roughly fifteen years after 
the end of the Cold War, we are now witnessing the normalization of transi-
tional justice, as seen in the current expansion of humanitarian law to ordi-
nary peacetime contexts. 
Finally, transitional justice is an important part of broader political devel-
opments in recent international history. Thus, in Phase I, transitional justice 
adhered to juridical rights enforcement associated with liberal ideals of rule 
of law. However, as time passed, those normative assumptions were chal-
lenged, and similar trends emerged in both transitional justice and in the 
broader discussion of the concept of the rule of law. Just as postmodernist 
challenges generally offer better critiques than practical strategies,151 in 
moving the discourse away from universalizing rule of law, the contempo-
rary transitional justice model reflects a limited critical response. The ge-
nealogical method is no exception: it yields ongoing critical cycles rather 
than a progressive history of transitional justice. 
151. On postmodernism as a source of critical theory, compare POSTMODERNISM & SOCIAL THEORY: 
THE DEBATE OVER GENERAL THEORY (Steven Seidman & David G. Wagner eds., 1992) (discussing the 
postmodern critique) with Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919 (1990). 
